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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
offer to the entire world. Further, this collateral agreement which was
entered into prior to any possible oral contract between the agent and the
buyer, and which certainly was not intended to be a memorandum of con-
tract, should not be construed as part of a memorandum subscribed by the
party sought to be charged.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENCY BY BAILE,-CRIMINAL INTENT-Defend-
ant was the president and general manager of S Corporation which oper-
ated a sawmill. The complaining witnesses were partners in a similar
business. A carload of lumber made up of lumber owned by both parties
was shipped and sold by S Corporation. The proceeds of the sale were
received by the defendant but no amount was paid to the partnership.
One of the complaining witnesses testified that there was no agreement
whereby the defendant could keep the proceeds of the sale and that the
defendant said he would turn over to the partnership its rightful share
upon receipt of the money. The defendant was convicted of larceny of
property held by him as bailee. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana, held, reversed. The state failed to prove the requisite criminal in-
tent since there was no showing of a concealment and the amount was
treated on the books of both firms as an open account. State v. Smith, 334
P.2d 1099 (Mont. 1959).
In most bailments a bailee's initial possession of the property is
legal. Therefore, unless the felonious intent to appropriate exists at the
time the bailee takes possession, there can be no larceny because of the
absence of the necessary trespass. This was the rule at common law and,
except where expressly modified by statute, it is the rule today.1 Be-
cause of this apparent defect in the law of larceny, the strictly statutory
crime of embezzlement was created by many legislatures.! Embezzlement
differs from larceny in that the property comes into the possession of
the taker lawfully and is later fraudulently or unlawfully appropriated
to another's use.' In some jurisdictions the conversion of property by a
bailee is made larceny by statute, but statutes establishing the crime of
larceny by bailee are more analogous to those of statutory embezzlement
than to common law larceny.'
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 94-2701, in defining the
statutory offense of larceny by bailee, provides in part:
Every person who, with the intent to permanently deprive or de-
fraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit
thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of
any other person either . . . or, (2) Having in his possession,
custody, or control, as bailee . . . any money, property, evidence
'32 AM. Jua. Larceny § 57 (1941).
'State v. Mathews, 143 Tenn. 463, 226 S.W. 203, 13 A.L.R. 314 (1920).
sMoore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 (1895) ; Eggleston v. State, 129 Ala. 80, 30 So.
582 (1901). For an excellent annotation concerning the distinction between larceny
and embezzlement see 146 A.L.R. 532 (1942).
'State v. Keelen, 10S Ore. 172, 203 Pac. 306 (1922).
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RECENT DECISIONS
of debt, or contract ... appropriates the same to his own use, or
that of any other person other than the true owner, or person en-
titled to the benefit thereof, steals such property and is guilty of
larceny. (Emphasis added.)
Thus a conversion by a bailee, if done with the requisite criminal intent to
deprive the bailor of his property, is expressly made a larceny under the
Montana statute. However, the legislature also undoubtedly intended the
statute to require that the taker must intend to permanently deprive the
owner of the property as in common-law larceny.
There are some factors in the principal case to indicate a criminal in-
tent on the part of the defendant. Knowing he was without right, the
defendant used the funds belonging to the complianants for his own pur-
poses and for two years persistently refused to make payment on repeated
demand. On the other hand, the funds were taken openly and this amount
was carried on the books of the partnership as an account receivable.
These accounting entries may not, however, be evidence that the debt was
merely part of an open account, but may simply indicate that the com-
plainants had hopes one day of recovering the stolen money.
The issue in the case is whether these facts should have been suf-
ficient to sustain a jury finding of criminal intent. In State v. McGuire'
a conviction under this same statutory provision was reversed. In dis-
cussing the requirement of criminal intent the court adopted the follow-
ing statement from a Michigan case: "Mere neglect to pay over money is
not sufficient proof of a fraudulent conversion to one's own use, for there
may be losses and failures to pay or even account where the failure is due
to misfortune or other cause not criminal.'" There was more than a mere
neglect to pay over the money in the instant case. The defendant deposited
the partnership's share of the proceeds, together with his own, in the cor-
poration's account. This was apparently done with full knowledge that
he had no right to do so. This cannot be classified as mere neglect, but
is more reasonably interpreted as a fraudulent appropriation of another's
property to one's own use.
Whatever the conclusion concerning intent to appropriate wrongfully,
there was no real evidence that the defendant intended more than a tem-
porary deprivation of the proceeds. The court quoted from other cases
which state that the requisite criminal intent is one to permanently de-
prive the owner of his property. The Montana court early stated this
rule, in Territory v. Paul,' as follows: "To constitute the crime of larceny,
the intent which accompanies the act of taking must be the criminal in-
tent to deprive the owner of his property, not temporarily, but permanent-
ly." This rule has been consistently applied by the Montana Supreme
Court An intention to repay at some future time would seem to be a natural
or at least a permissible inference from the fact that both parties carried
'107 Mont. 341, 88 P.2d 35 (1988).
Id. at 347, 88 P.2d at 36.
'2 Mont. 314, 319 (1875).
$See State v. Labbit, 117 Mont. 26, 156 P.2d 163 (1945) ; State v. Wallin, 60 Mont.
332, 199 Pac. 285 (1921).
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the proceeds as open accounts in their respective books. Further, the
fact that the defendant notified the complaining witnesses of the receipt
of the funds would indicate that he did not intend to permanently with-
hold the funds from the partnership.
The outcome of the instant case would seem correct, but it is submitted
that certain emphasis in the case is somewhat misleading. The court
states?
The only possible circumstance which would indicate an intent to
fraudulently deprive the Grizzly Bear Company of its money per-
manently is the assertion by Ted Gustafson, one of the complain-
ing witnesses, that the defendant did not inform him of his re-
ceipt of the proceeds until some two or three weeks after the car
was loaded and shipped. However, there is nothing in the record
to indicate even roughly the date this remittance was received by
Smith so we are in no way able to infer that he concealed, even for
a short time, his receipt of the money. (Emphasis added.)
The court in the instant case seems to place great weight on the fact that
there was no concealment of the money by the defendant. Concealment is
almost terated as an essential element of the crime. Conceding that con-
cealment is nearly always present in cases of larceny, it would seem that
its absence would not make a criminal act any less unlawful. Can it be
said that a person who performs all the elements necessary for the crime
of larceny can escape prosecution simply by taking and holding the stolen
property openly and notoriously? Such a position would clearly be un-
tenable and erroneous.
Undue stress was also given to the fact that the owner was lax for a
time in enforcing payment. Logically it does not seem that the bailor's sub-
sequent conduct should have anything to do with whether a crime was
committed. If a bailee intends to permanently convert the property at the
outset, the crime should be completed at that time. If the crime is then
complete, the owner's subsequent conduct should not exculpate the of-
fender.
MAURICE R. COLBERG, JR.
DIVORCE--MODIFICATION PROCEEDING AFTER FINAL DECREE-COUNSEL
FEEs-In 1954, the defendant wife was granted a final decree of divorce
from the appellant. She was awarded custody of their minor children sub-
ject to visitation rights of the appellant. In 1955, after the statutory
time for appeal of a divorce decree had expired, the appellant filed for a
modification of the custody order, seeking to restrict the residence of
the children. The lower court denied the appellant's motion and allowed
the wife counsel fees. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, af-
'Instant case at 1102.
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